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Mr. W. P. Jackson  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, 25, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Here are the last three broadcasts that we were discussing  
yesterday at the Club. You might want to skim through them.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,



DL:D

Enc....

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And what's more, there isn't a bit of evidence that MacArthur disagreed with the administration here on policy with respect to his position as supreme allied commander in Japan. There has never been any White House explanation -- even though it was considered necessary to appoint General Ridgway supreme commander in Korea -- as to why it was necessary at the same time to relieve General MacArthur of his occupation post in Japan where he had done such an excellent job in carrying out the policies of the President and the Department of State.

Next question: "But what of General MacArthur's statement to Congress that the Joint Chiefs supported his military recommendations on the Far Eastern war?"

The General spoke the truth literally. The Joint Chiefs did support him from a military standpoint. I asked Senator Russell of Georgia, Democrat, chairman of the Senate Armed Services committee, which is to conduct the coming investigation of the whole affair, whether he was quoted correctly in what he said the other day about the General's address to Congress. He confirmed it to me today:

"I think he (MacArthur) was wholly consistent in stating the 'military standpoint'. But when you get down to political consequences -- that presents an entirely different question. From the 'military standpoint' I doubt if any man in his right mind would differ with General MacArthur."

I have investigated this matter -- as any reporter must these days when conflicting statements are issued -- and I find that, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff did agree with General MacArthur's military viewpoint, these same Joint Chiefs did not enter into recommendations as to what should be done when matters of international policy were later presented to them -- that is, when our allies in Europe, notably England, protested. In other words, when the Secretary of State declares what he thinks is a desirable course to take to please our allies and to hold them in line, the custom today for the military chiefs in the Pentagon is to call that a "policy" or "political" question and wash their hands of any responsibility for a decision.

That's what General Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, meant when he spoke at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, a few days ago. He said:

"I think General MacArthur's dismissal is primarily political and my job is military. We render our advice from a military point of view, always realizing that the military point of view may not necessarily be the guiding one."

Now let us look at another question:

"When did the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically support the military recommendations outlined by General MacArthur in his address to Congress last Thursday?"

Radio Broadcast by David Lawrence, Editor, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Washington, D. C., over network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, April 22, 1951, 3:30 PM, EST, as part of a radio program sponsored by the American Dairy Association.

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We are entering a period of debate important to the future of our country. Hence it is important that we distinguish between facts and propaganda, official or otherwise -- between partisan expressions and an objective search for truth.

Today there are certain questions of fact and truth to which I shall draw your attention. The first question:

"Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommend the dismissal of General MacArthur, as stated officially by the White House last week?"

No, not at all. The White House statement is only a half truth and hence is misleading. I'll read you the brief White House statement and then tell you what really happened. Here is the exact text of the announcement at the Pentagon building last Thursday:

"In response to inquiries from the press concerning General MacArthur's reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Pentagon spokesman said that the White House had authorized him to state that the action taken by the President in relieving General MacArthur was based upon the unanimous recommendations of the President's principal civilian and military advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Now what are the facts? First, there was no formal meeting of the Joint Chiefs and hence no recommendation, therefore, by that body to the President on this subject. There was a meeting in which civilian and military advisers sat down together with the President to answer inquiries from him as to what he should do about the controversy over General MacArthur's expressed views. Each member of the conference gave his ideas. There was a general feeling that, since the President and General MacArthur did not see eye to eye on the policies -- that is, foreign policies -- the General should be replaced. There was no recommendation that he had violated any military order or that he had been guilty of insubordination and that hence he should be subjected to any disciplinary measures. The timing of the replacement and the method of making the replacement were left entirely to the President to decide. Some members of that small conference learned later what the President's action would be, but some of them read it for the first time in the newspapers the morning after the famous midnight instruction to dismiss General MacArthur was announced.

So it is inaccurate to place upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility for the abrupt dismissal of General MacArthur. As military men, they do not usually order a commander to relinquish his command on a moment's notice without even a chance to turn his affairs over to a successor or to have the opportunity to say farewell to his troops -- a privilege dear to any commander of troops. The summary dismissal was Mr. Truman's own impulsive action.

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disagree with the President on this say that parity only assures the farmers a fair price and that, if the parity price rises, it is only a reflection of the increase in industrial prices. Therefore, the argument runs, to freeze "parity" would, in effect, penalize farmers for each crop a year at a time. Also, if price and wage controls generally were really to work, parity prices would not change anyway. So the proposal -- as the agricultural groups in Congress see it -- really puts the cart before the horse. Actually only meats, cotton and wool are above parity price now and to freeze those other products at their present level -- before they have reached parity -- is to destroy altogether the parity principle now in the law.

Some products of the farm might be handled on an annual basis with little difficulty -- but not all of them. My own feeling is that the move primarily represents a gesture to labor. It appears to be part of the effort to create psychological barriers against further inflation rather than to start any real deflation of prices.

Before the present Defense Production Act expires on June 30th next, there will have been so much controversy over a new law that a resolution to continue the existing statute for another year is likely to be adopted as the only way out of a deadlock.

Next question: "What does the latest order putting a ceiling price on meat really mean?"

It means that the housewife -- not now but sometime in October -- will pay 9 or 10 cents less for a pound of beef, if she can get it. The black market will come in again. We may see a storekeeper selling beef at the legal price but putting up prices on other products or selling the beef to his best customers so as to cover himself on what he may lose in order to get beef supplies from black markets. That's what the meat industry spokesmen are already saying is going to happen because it happened before when we had price ceilings. Remember there is no ceiling on the price of the live animal itself.

The real answer to all this is to stimulate increased production and not to bring about a scarcity or, ultimately, rationing.

Now turning to Europe. The next question: "Will the British Cabinet upset of last week have any effect on us?"

Yes, I think it will. For it is the beginning of an eventual change in the line-up of the government of Great Britain. The conservatives of Great Britain seem sure to come into power this year and, when they do, a better understanding of the United States is likely. We should not condemn Great Britain for the "left wing" sympathies of its present government or for its tendency to place Socialistic reforms above the needs of rearmament. Winston Churchill, leader of the Conservatives, who may come into power again, does not agree with all our policies, but he knows and appreciates the value of cooperation with America. He is a skillful negotiator. He will strive to achieve better relations with us. Actually the resignation of one of the British Cabinet members last week reveals Prime Minister Attlee's troubles, inside his party. When some of the Laborites would rather appropriate money for free false teeth and other extravagances of government than for the defense of Great Britain, the real issue emerges. It is whether the democracies of the free world will keep on spending their money just to get the votes of special groups or whether they will make sacrifices and spend the money needed to assure safety.

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These are topsy-turvy times. Strong emotions come to the surface in public discussions both inside and outside the halls of Congress. It is more than ever a time for patience and forbearance. But this does not mean a surrender of convictions or a willingness to let important principles go by the boards.

It is a time for full debate and for full information. A democracy that is afraid of debate can never establish the truth. A democracy which adopts the idea that the king can do wrong will not long remain a democracy. Let's not be afraid to talk just because somebody in Moscow may be listening in. A democracy that gives the impression that it is afraid of its shadow will invite general war. Let's be governed by our convictions and not by our fears. It's only by criticism and the give-and-take of public discussion that democracy can provide the ultimate unity which it needs to meet a great crisis.

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The first question which I imagine all of you would like to have answered today is: "What's going to happen next in Korea?"

One thing you can be sure of -- the Communist Chinese will suffer heavy losses as they extend their lines southward and as we retreat. This new offensive of the Chinese Communists may last several weeks. Then will come the critical moment. If the Chinese Communist leaders have had enough and can tear themselves away from Moscow's influence, they might enter a peace conference and try to get a compromise settlement. But if their Russian masters insist, there probably will be another offensive a few months hence and then another offensive and so on. It could mean a prolonged war. One naval officer, back from Tokyo, not long ago told me he would not be surprised if the kind of war we are fighting in Korea went on for ten years -- that is, if the American people are content with an indecisive war and a stalemate and 60 to 70 thousand casualties a year.

The next question: "What will be the consequences of the MacArthur episode?"

I think the President in due time will find it necessary to adopt the MacArthur recommendations. These are an economic blockade of China participated in good faith by all members of the U. N., the bombing of Manchurian bases, and the lifting of all restrictions against the Nationalist Government on Formosa so that it can try to recapture the mainland of China. Only a few days ago it was announced, for example, by our Department of State that a military mission of several hundred American officers and other personnel is being sent by our Government to help train the troops of the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa. This is supposed to enable the Nationalist armies to resist the attack when it comes from the Communists in China. The troops trained for defensive purposes, however, can someday also be used for the offensive -- that is, to land on the coast of China as MacArthur recommended. At no time, incidentally, did MacArthur advocate that American troops be used on the mainland of China. As for giving our Air Force the right to fly in the skies above Manchuria and see what military preparations are being made there from day to day, I am sure the time is not far off when the President will authorize this just as MacArthur has been advocating.

As for the bombing of Communist air and supply bases in Manchuria, I feel sure that our commanders in Korea have already been told that, if the Red air offensive really opens up on a large scale, we are to fight back and bomb those bases. It is interesting to quote in this connection from a copyrighted interview with General Stratemeyer in this week's issue of "U.S. News & World Report." General Stratemeyer, commander of our Air force in the Far East, said:

"If we don't blunt that air offensive, it means our ground forces are going to get hit and our installations in the rear will get hit. I am concerned also about my own air facilities in Korea, which can be attacked from the air. The enemy can hit me where I am based, but I can't hit him."

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Now you may ask why General Stratemeyer has not yet been ordered to bomb the enemy bases. The only answer I can give you is that the President feels he cannot go against the wishes of Great Britain and other governments in the United Nations who seem to feel this would expand the war in the Far East and bring Russia in. Nowadays America doesn't make up its own mind but other governments make it up for us -- and we supply most of the casualties.

But, you may ask, isn't the real reason that, if we bomb the enemy bases and help Nationalist troops get back to the mainland of China, there may be a general war?

There's just as strong, if not stronger military judgment, which says general war will not develop in Asia no matter what we do, as there is to support the opposite view. Russia has a mutual assistance pact with China, but it will be recalled that Russia had a mutual assistance pact with Japan in 1945 and did not honor it. I am surprised to observe so many Americans assuming Russia will honor her agreements when everybody knows she will do what is expedient and disregard her agreements if it suits her. The risk of war with Russia is far less today than it will be five years from now, when Russia will have strengthened her position not only in Asia but in Europe -- unless Communist imperialism is definitely and decisively blocked now.

Meanwhile, ten to twenty shiploads of strategic war materials a week are reaching Chinese ports for the use of Communist Chinese armies according to Hanson Baldwin, military expert of the N.Y. Times. Much of it is coming from Great Britain and India. Communist China is supposed to be the enemy of the United Nations but the United States Navy is prevented from imposing a blockade on the China Coast as General MacArthur has recommended. Trading with the enemy used to be unmoral. But evidently it isn't for Great Britain, India and the other members of the United Nations who are doing it today.

Turning now from Asia to our domestic front, the big question this week is: "Are our farmers facing a price freeze such as was recommended by the President to Congress last week?"

I don't believe so. Congress is cool to the idea of new legislation. While it is claimed that the Truman plan does not disturb the principle of parity, it really does. Let me explain first what is meant by that word "parity."

Congress, by law, has said that farmers should get a fair price for their products -- and that this price should enable the farmer to buy the things he needs, like machinery, fuel, supplies, etc. So a yardstick was set up to measure farm prices in relation to industrial prices. As industrial prices changed, so did farm prices. Farm prices were to be on a par with or at a point of parity with or in balance with an original base of 1910 to 1914 average prices for farm products. The President insists that he, too, favors the parity principle but he says it should apply once and for all at the start of a crop season and not be changed every 30 days as it is now when industrial price changes become known. Members of Congress who

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That came very recently -- on January 12, 1951. Also, within the very last month the Joint Chiefs recommended formally that the question of Formosa should be eliminated from any discussion of a settlement at this time. In fact, this recommendation was sent to General MacArthur and it was on this information that he based his March 24th proposal to the Chinese Reds for a "cease fire" in which he urged that the whole settlement in the field be confined to Korea only.

Next question: "Did MacArthur ever recommend that Red China sit in on the making of a Japanese treaty?"

He did not, and the record in due time will show it.

Now we come to a question that has been bandied about a lot in the last several days: "Why did MacArthur tell the President at Wake Island last October that he did not think Red China would intervene in the Korean war?"

He did so because every scrap of information from the Department of State and from our military intelligence cleared from all parts of the world indicated that same conclusion. The radio warnings to the contrary from Peiping and India were considered deliberate propaganda by our own Government in Washington. Otherwise, the Department of State and our Joint Chiefs of Staff -- to whom MacArthur had sent word in advance of his intended march to the Yalu River last November -- would have warned him not to launch that offensive. The Department of State and our intelligence services must share the blame for the wrong guess made that Red China would not intervene in Korea. In fact, just a few weeks before the President's conference at Wake Island with General MacArthur, Secretary of State Acheson, in a prepared statement over a television network on September 10 last, told the American people that he saw no reason why Communist China should "get into this Korea row."

Bear in mind that MacArthur last October had only the reports of his own Government to rely on. He couldn't send his planes into Manchuria to find out what the enemy was building up there. That was forbidden to him -- an enormous handicap, as he once said, without precedent in military history.

Next question: "Does MacArthur want to initiate a war against Red China?"

That question is asked again and again, but the question itself is based upon an unsound assumption. The war with Red China has already been initiated. All MacArthur wanted to do was to protect his troops against the enemy air attacks and pursue a war already begun, and that's what the entire military establishment really wanted to do -- provided the "policy makers" didn't interfere.

Next question: "But wouldn't Russia intervene and wouldn't we have a general war if MacArthur's plea to bomb enemy bases was granted?"

I don't think anybody can guess that answer. But it is important to note that the argument usually made that, because Russia has a mutual assistance treaty with Red China, Moscow will feel bound to go to war against anybody who bombs Red China's bases. But is Russia so meticulous, after all, in obeying her treaty obligations? Russia had a mutual assistance treaty, too, with Japan throughout World War II. Yet, in August, 1945, she ignored it when it was expedient for her to do so and she joined us in fighting Japan.

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"What comes next in Korea?"

The enemy is building up an air offensive. A few moments ago I read news dispatches telling of a big battle of jet planes going on in North Korea today. The Government here will have to decide soon whether to let the enemy bomb our troops or say that we can't strike back at their bases. Meanwhile, I want to say right here that these questions are of such a serious nature we ought to avoid acrimonious discussion. Certainly I disapprove vehemently of the boos that were given President Truman at the baseball game last Friday. That's no way to treat a President of the United States, even if you disagree with him.

Next question: "How are we going to get unity?"

In answering that question I can do no better than to quote a letter of November 17, 1949, which the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan wrote to me and which I feel privileged to make public today. He said:

"I want free debate in making our foreign policies because in the final analysis, they are dangerously futile without public support. On the other hand, I want ultimate unity in foreign policies because without it the voice of America lacks the authority essential to peaceful success."

What does the people's demonstration for General MacArthur really mean? It means that the America of today has not forgotten patriotism or love of country or gratitude for the valor and sacrifices of its soldiers. It means that America is not cynical or indifferent or afraid to cheer or ashamed to cry. It means that America has not succumbed to official propaganda and misleading statements, that America does not condemn a man without a hearing. It means that America does not approve of the way in which a man of great military achievements was relieved of his command. It means that in honoring Douglas MacArthur, America is rendering a salute to courage.

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